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COMMENTS
CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw - VALIDITY OF STATE OccuPATION TAX
ON CoNTRACTORS WITH THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT - The increasing burden of both federal and state taxation during the past decade has
multiplied the attempts by some of those affected to establish, in the
courts, immunity from certain taxes. The limitations of the power of
the governments to tax have, then, special significance for one who
seeks, in that fashion, to challenge the imposition of a tax on himself.
Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court involved one of
those limitations-that which denies to the states the power to enforce
a tax which impedes the exercise of the powers of the federal government.
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In the first of these cases,1 a Pennsylvania construction company,
admitted to do business in West Virginia, sought to restrain the collection of an annual privilege tax by that state. 2 The tax was measured
by the gross receipts of the company from business done within the
state. In so far as those· gross receipts included amounts received from
the federal government under contracts calling for the construction
of certain locks and dams in one of the navigable rivers of the state,
the company claimed an exemption on the grounds (I) that it was a
federal instrumentality, and ( 2) that the tax was a direct burden on
the exercise of one of the powers of the federal government. The tax
was levied in addition to a license tax on foreign corporations admitted
to do business in the state and ad valorem taxes upon the real and
personal property of the company in the state.
In the second case,8 again, a construction company sought to restrain
collection of a similar occupation tax measured by gross receipts,4 imposed by the state of Washington in addition to other taxes, in so far
as the receipts came from the federal government under contracts for
work on the Bonneville Dam Project in the state. The same reasons
for the exemption were advanced.
In both cases, the Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Hughes, denied the contentions of the taxpayers and sustained the
constitutionality of the taxes, with four members of the Court dissenting.
I.

Without at least a passing glance at the origin and development
of this limitation on the state's power to tax, the full import of these
recent decisions is lost. 5
1

James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937).
W. Va. Acts (1st Ex. Sess. 1933), c. 33, § 2(e), amending W. Va. Code
(193_1), § II-13-2(e), provides: "Upon every person engaging in or continuing
within this state in the business of contracting, the tax shall be equal to two per cent
of the gross income of the business."
8 Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 58 S. Ct.
233 (1937).
4 Wash. Laws (Spec. Sess. 1933), c. 57, § 2-a, amending Laws (1933), c. 191,
provides that: "every person engaging or continuing within this state in the business
of rendering or performing services. • . . [ shall pay] an annual tax or excise for the
privilege of engaging in such business. . . . equal to the gross income of the business
multiplied by five tenths of one per cent.••."
5 In general, see Cohen and Dayton, "Federal Taxation of State Activities and
State Taxation of Federal Activities," 34 YALE L. J. 807 (1925); Boudin, "The
Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities," 22 GEORGETOWN L. J. I (1933), 254
(1934); Stoke, "State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities," 22 lowA L.
REv. 39 (1936); Brown, "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and
State Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations-1932-1935," 24 GEORGETOWN L. J.
584 (1936); 23 VA. L. REV. 922 (1937).
2
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The doctrine was enunciated first in McCulloch v. Maryland,"
when the Supreme Court, without dissent, struck down a tax law
enacted by the state of Maryland, requiring the United States Bank
to pay tribute to the state government for the privilege of issuing notes.
The argument of Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion, was
twofold. First, he declared, 7 the powers of the federal government
were not given by the people of a particular state. They were given by
the people of all the states. Their exercise, then, should, in theory,
be free from control through taxation or otherwise by any goyernment
except that which belongs to all. Second,8 because the power to tax the
means employed in the exercise of the powers of the federal government involved the power to destroy such means, and the power to
destroy renders useless the power to create them, the assertion of this
power in the state was plainly repugnant to the express declaration of
the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof. He concluded therefore that
"the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution
the powers vested in the general government." 9
This position was reaffirmed five years later in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States,1° which involved a similar hostile attack on the
bank. And then in Weston v. City of Charleston,11 Marshall, who wrote
the opinion holding a state tax on federal bonds invalid, pointed out
the nature of the burden such a tax placed on the federal government.
His position was that
"The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must
operate on the power to borrow, before it is exercised, and have
a sensible influence on the contract •.• To any extent, however inconsiderable, it is a burden upon the operations of government." 12
6

4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819).
Ibid. at 427-431.
8 Ibid. at 431-436. Marshall's feeling that the power to tax involved the power
to destroy was amply justified at the time it was made. During the period 1816-1819,
six_ of the states enacted tax laws directed solely against the United States Bank, laws
intended to drive it from business within their borders. 1 WARREN, THE SuPR.EME
CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTOR.Y, rev. ed., 505 (1935). It was legislation of this
character which was before the court in McCulloch v. Maryland.
9
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 436.
10 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824).
11 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 449 (1829). The taxing ordinance was plainly discriminatory for certain classes of bonds were excepted.
12
Ibid. at 468.
7
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Similar reasoning was followed in Dobbins v. Erie County,13 where
a state property tax on the value of a United States office was held
invalid.
The Civil War and Reconstruction periods with their financial_
problems brought many cases involving state taxation before the Supreme Court. The line between burdensome and non-burdensome taxes
began to be determined by the familiar pricking out process, and that
process still continues. On the one side, property taxes on federal
securities were held invalid.14 It was thought such taxes were a burden
on the borrowing power of the federal government, even though the
taxes were non-discriminatory. The reasoning of Marshall in Weston
v. Charleston 15 was relied on. Likewise, state taxes on property owned
by the federal government were struck down.16 State privilege taxes,
too, were overthrown where the privilege taxed was given by the federal government and where its exercise was to be a means of carrying
out government powers.11 The same result followed where the
16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 435 (1842).
Thus the capital stock of banks was held immune from taxation in so far as
the capital stock included tax-exempt federal securities. People ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. New York Tax Comm., 2 Black. (67 U. S.) 620 (1863); People ex rel.
Bank of Commerce v. New York Tax Comm. (Bank Tax Case), 2 Wall. (69 U. S.)
200 (1865). The rule laid down in these cases was followed in Home Savings Bank v.
Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27 S. Ct. 571 (1907); and in Farmers & Mechanics'
Sav. Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516, 34 S. Ct. 354 (1913).
In The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. (64 U.S.) 16 (1868), a state property tax
on federal certificates of indebtedness issued by the Treasury to public creditors for
supplies furnished the government during the war was struck down as a burden on the
borrowing power. And in Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 26 (1868), a state
property tax on United States notes-greenbacks-issued to circulate as currency was
held bad. The court emphasized the likelihood that the tax would restrict free circulation and thus defeat Congressional purposes.
The doctrine of immunity was extended naurally enough to protect the exercise
of other governmental powers than the borrowing power. In Indian Territory Illuminaing Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522, 36 S. Ct. 453 (1915), a state property tax
on a lease held on Indian lands pursuant to an Act of Congress was held bad. Jaybird
Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 46 S. Ct. 592 (1926), invalidated a property
tax on ore severed by, and in bins of, a lessee of Indian lands.
15 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 449 (1824).
16 McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 23 (1869) (land owned by the federal
government not subject to state taxation). Accord: Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117
U.S. 151, 6 S. Ct. 670 (1885). In Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341,
44 S. Ct. 121 ( 1923), taxes on personal and real property of a government-owned
war-time corporation were held invalid.
17 California v. Central Pacific Ry., 127 U.S. 1, 8 S. Ct. 1073 (1887) (the
assessed valuation of the railway included the value of franchises given the railway
by the federal government); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 8 S. Ct. 1380
(1887) (license tax on a telegraph company held void as a tax on the privilege of
carrying government messages); Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664,
18

14
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tax was on a privilege exercised by the government itself as a means
of executing its powers.16 Likewise, state taxes, in whatever form,
directed at income from federal instrumentalities were held invalid.19
On the other side, in accord with Marshall's dictum in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 20 property of a federal instrumentality was held to be
subject to a non-discriminatory state property tax, even though sucli
property was used by the agency in carrying out Congressional purposes. 21 This result has been consistently followed. 22 And whatever the
form of the tax,-so long as it was not imposed on the federal instru19 S. Ct. 537 (1899) (tax on the franchise of a national bank held invalid because
it did not meet Congressional requirements); Williams v. Talladega,.226 U.S. 404,
419, 33 S. Ct. 116 (1912) (license tax on the privilege of carrying intrastate governmental messages by telegraph held invalid).
18 Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881) (tax on each telegraph message
sent void as to messages sent by the government); Federal Land Bank v. Crosland,
261 U.S. 374, 43 S. Ct. 385 (1922) (state privilege tax on recording of mortgages
in addition to the normal recording fee held invalid as to mortgages made by the
Federal Land Bank); Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277
U.S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451 (1927) (state privilege tax on dealers in gasoline measured
by number of gallons sold held invalid so far as sales were to federal governmental
agencies); Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 818 (1935) (state tax held
to be in effect on sales and therefore so far as sales were to the federal government,
the tax was invalid).
19 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S. Ct. 171 (1921) (state tax on
net income from oil lease given by the government for the benefit of Indian wards
held invalid); Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713, 47 S. Ct. 280 (1926) (state tax
on that portion of corporate dividends equal to the exempt portion of corporate income
held invalid); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, 48 S. Ct.
5 5 ( I 92 7) (purported privilege tax measured by a given per cent of gross receipts
of domestic corporations held invalid in so far as gross receipts came from tax exempt
bonds); Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 49 S. Ct. 432 (1928) (purported privilege tax on corporations measured by a given per cent of net income held invalid as an attempt to reach tax exempt income, in view of special facts).
20 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 436 (1819), quoted supra at note 9.
21 Thomson v. Pacific R.R., 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 579 (1869) (property taxes on
state chartered railroad corporation obliged to give special performance to the federal
government in execution of governmental powers); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall.
( 8 5 U.S.) 5 ( 1873) (property taxes on a railroad company chartered by Congress) .
22 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530, 8 S. Ct. 961 (1887),
and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U.S. 1, 16 S. Ct. 1054 (1895) (property
taxes on telegraph company property maintained pursuant to act of Congress and used
for government purposes); Hibernia Savings & Loan Society v. San Francisco, 200
U.S. 310, 26 S. Ct. 265 (1906) (property tax on checks drawn by the United States
treasurer payable to a private person but not yet cashed) [ cf. Bank v. Supervisors, 7
Wall. (74 U.S.) 26 (1868), discussed supra, note 14]; Dyer v. City of Melrose,
215 U.S. 594, 30 S. Ct. 410 (1909) (property tax on bank "deposit of naval officer
which included a salary deposit); Choctaw, 0. & G. Ry. v. Mackey, 256 U.S. 531,
41 S. Ct. 582 (1920) (special assessment for street improvement levied against depot
property of the railway which was the successor to a company chartered by Congress
to develop Indian coal lands); Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm., 283

COMMENTS

mentality, but upon an independent interest, any burden has been
regarded as indirect and incidental, and the tax has been upheld. 28
Even where the tax was on a privilege given by the federal government, it has been held not an unconstitutional burden if the privilege
given was to be exercised for the benefit of the recipient rather than
as an agent of the government to carry out Congressional purposes.24
Much of the development of the doctrine limiting state powers
took place in a similar and not unrelated situation. Collector v. Day 25
found the court limiting, by analogy, the power of the federal government to tax state instrumentalities. Such a limitation seems quite out of
the spirit of the argument in McCulloch v. Maryland. 26 Yet this
U.S. 291, 51 S. Ct. 434 (1930) (tax on lands flooded by building of a power dam
under license from the federal government); Indian Territory llluminating Oil Co.
v. Board of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325, 53 S. Ct. 388 (1932) (property tax on
crude oil, produced under Indian oil lease, stored in tanks on the company's land)
[cf. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 46 S. Ct. 592 (1926), discussed
supra, note 14]; Taber v. Indian Territory llluminating Oil Co., 300 U.S. 1, 57
S. Ct. 334 (1936) (property tax on equipment of lessee of Indian oil lands). But
see Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 44 S. Ct. 121 (1923), discussed
supra note 16, and Stoke, "State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities,"
22 lowA L. REv. 39 (1936).
28
Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 573 (1865) (tax on interest of
shareholders in national bank held not to be a tax on federal securities even though the
whole capital stock of the bank was tax exempt bonds); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, II9
U.S. 129, 8 S. Ct. 1385 (1886) (franchise tax on domestic corporations measured in
part by the value of the capital stock which included tax exempt bonds); Plummer v.
Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 20 S. Ct. 829 (1900) (tax on legacy consisting of federal bonds);
Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 51 S. Ct. 170 (1930) (tax on
privilege of doing business measured by net income including income from tax exempt
bonds) [cf. Macallan Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 49 S. Ct. 432 (1928),
discussed supra, note 18]; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509, 51 S. Ct. 273 (1930)
(privilege tax measured by gross receipts including income from government mail
contract) [cf. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, 48 S. Ct.
55, discussed supra, note 18]; Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S.
466, 54 S. Ct. 469 (1933) (excise tax on gasoline purchased by a contractor for use
on a federal government project held valid).
24
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U.S. 319, 36 S. Ct. 298 (1915)
(privilege tax measured by gross receipts which included premiums paid on fidelity
bonds running to the government); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 52 S. Ct.
546 ( l 931) (tax on the privilege of doing business measured by gross receipts, all of
which were copyright royalties); Lexington Water Power Co. v. Query, 288 U.S. 178,
53 S. Ct. 3 26 ( 193 2) (tax on production and sale of electric energy produced under
permit from the federal government); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean,
291 U.S. 17, 54 S. Ct. 267 (1933) (excise tax measured by capacity, on warehouse
operating under permit from federal government).
25
II Wall. (78 U.S.) n3 (1870) (federal tax upon income of a state judicial
officer held invalid as a burden on an instrumentality of the state government).
26 See supra at note 7. And see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 533

(1869).
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reciprocal application of the rule has prevailed since,21 and precedents
in the one situation have been used in the other, though not without
vigorous criticism.28
Throughout these decisions there seems to be but the single principle enunciated by Marshall-that the states have no power to impede or hinder the execution of federal powers. The great difficulty
lies in the proper application of the principle, as is so often true, and
it was this problem of application that divided the Court in the instant
cases.
2.

The factors which determine whether a state tax imposes a burden
on federal functions are varied and uncertain, changing with each case.
It has been said the proper test is a practical one 29--does the operation
27 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583, 15 S. Ct. 673
(1894) (federal tax on general income including.that from state and municipal bonds
held bad under the rule of Weston v. City of Charleston) [ cf. cases cited in note I 9] ;
Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1930)
[ excise tax paid by seller to the federal government on the sale of a motorcycle to a
municipal police department held bad on authority of Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox,
277 U.S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451 (1927), discussed supra, note 18]. The exceptions to
the exemption rule are many and the tendency in recent years has been to limit
exemptions sharply. Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384, 42 S. Ct. 324 (1921) (federal
estate tax on net assets including state and municipal bonds held valid) [ cf. Plummer
v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 20 S. Ct. 829 (1900), discussed supra, note 23]; Metcalf
& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172 (1925) (federal income tax on
incomes derived from independent contracts with state governments held good);
Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 50 S. Ct.
419 (1930) (federal tax on transportation held valid on a shipment f.o.b. point of
delivery, where delivery was to a county government) [ cf. Indian Motocycle Co. v.
United States, .supra]; Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 51 S. Ct. 125 (1930)
(federal income tax on profit derived from sale of state bonds held valid and not a
tax on a state instrumentality); Group No. I Oil Co. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279, 5I
S. Ct. 432 (1930) (federal income tax on net profits from operation of oil lease of
state school lands held valid, because the lease amounted to a sale) [ cf. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S. Ct. 171 (1921), discussed supra, note 19]; Burnet v.
A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U.S. 508, 53 S. Ct. 439 (1932) (income tax on profits of
oil lessee of city government held valid because the city's lease was a proprietary function). In general on this distinction, see comment in 23 VA. L. REv. 922 (1937);
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171 (1934) (income tax on salary of
state officer appointed manager of municipal railway, because the function was a proprietary one); Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 383, 57 S. Ct.
239 (1936) (tobacco excise tax on manufactures held valid as to tobacco sold to a state
institution} [ cf. Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, supra].
28 See, for instance, the dissent of Stone, J., in Indian Motocycle Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1930); and see Boudin, "Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities," 22 GEORGETOWN L. J. 254 (1934).
29 Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 S. Ct. 125 (1930); Graves v. Texas
Company, 298 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 818 (1935).
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of the tax as a practical matter hinder the execution of governmental
powers? That a state tax if enforced would have such effect in cases
like McCulloch v. Maryland and Bank v. Osborn seems indisputable.
In such instances, the tax would force the cessation of activity necessary
to effectuate the Congressional purpose.
In any case less clear than one of the type mentioned, there is
immediate difficulty in determining whether the tax is a burden in the
constitutional sense. The language of Marshall in Weston v. City of
Charleston 80 seems to suggest that the tax there imposed hindered the
government's exercise of the borrowing power by placing the government in a less favorable bargaining position. That may well have been
the effect because that tax was discriminatory. Yet even where the tax
is non-discriminatory, the same feeling has been expressed in recent
cases that if the government is unable to make as favorable terms
in the face of the tax as it could were there no tax, then the tax is a
burden on the exercise of the government's powers.81 In the instant
case, however, where this was the ultimate contention of the taxpayer,
the Chief Justice said:
"But if it be assumed that the gross receipts tax may increase the
cost to the Government, that fact would not invalidate the tax.
With respect to that effect, a tax on the contractor's gross receipts would not differ from a tax on the contractor's property
and equipment necessarily used in the performance of the contract.
Concededly, such a tax may be validly laid. Property taxes are
naturally, as in this case, reckoned as a part of the expense of
doing the work." 32
The soundness of this position seems clear. 83 As pointed out by
Quoted supra, at note 12.
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 45 I (1927); Graves
v. Texas Company, 298 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 818 (1935); Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U.S. 501, 42 S. Ct. 171 (1921).
82 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 at 160, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937).
See the dissent by Holmes, J., in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct.
451 (1927); and Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 604, 54
S. Ct. 712 (1933). In Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. United States, 299 U. S.
383, 57 S. Ct. 239 (1936), increased cost to a state government because of the federal
excise tax on manufactures was held no burden justifying exemption. To the same
effect is Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 572, 50
S. Ct. 419 (1930).
88 The cases cited in notes 21 and 22. The unsatisfactory character of this test
of the burden is further revealed in the criticism of Stone, J., in his dissent in Indian
Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 at 581, 51 S. Ct. 601 (1930), where
he pointed out that "whether the burden of any tax paid by the seller is actually passed
on to the buyer depends upon considerations so various and complex as to preclude the
assumption a priori that any particular tax at any particular time is passed on. In some
80

81
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Justice Holmes in his dissent in the Panhandle Oil Company case,34
"When the Government comes into a State to purchase I do not
perceive why it should be entitled to stand differently from any
other purchaser. It avails itself of the machinery furnished by the
State and I do not see why it should not contribute in the same
proportion that every other purchaser contributes for the privileges that it uses. It has no better or other right to use them
than anyone else. The cost of maintaining the State that makes
the business possible is just as necessary an element in the cost
of production as labor or coal."
Holmes' suggestions are heresy considered along with those technical arguments 35 on which Marshall relied in the first case raising
the problem. Holmes felt there was no difficulty to be encountered with
the proposition that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.
In his dissent in the Panhandle Oil Company case, he asserted that
the power to tax is not the power to destroy so long as the Supreme
Court sits, for the power to tax is no longer regarded as the absolute
power it was thought to be in Marshall's time. Just as the courts act
as a check on the legislative bodies which fix rates, and thus insure fair
and reasonable rates, so can the Court act to invalidate a tax the operation of which interferes with the execution of federal functions. 36 And
as pointed out above, increased cost to the government is no criterion
of such interference.
So far as the other argument of McCulloch v. Maryland is concerned, that taxation of the federal government by the people of one
state amounts to taxation of the people of all the states by the people
of one state, Holmes' statement that if the government of all the
people chooses to take advantage of the machinery furnished by a
single state it ought to contribute is a pertinent reply. If the governconditions of the market, the burden remains with the seller, or even may be shifted
back from the seller to the producer by the reduction of the producer's price, rather than
forward to the consumer by an increase in the seller's price." The authorities cited by
the justice for this proposition include all the modern writers on taxation. See especially, SELIGMAN, SHIFTING AND, INCIDENCE OF TAXATION, 5th ed., 218-219, 253-254
(1924). The same uncertainty attending the determination of the ultimate bearer of
a sales tax prevails whatever the form of the tax. See Seligman, op. cit., for a discussion
of the incidence of each of the kinds of tax.
34 277 U.S. 218 at 224, 48 S. Ct. 451 (1927).
35 See supra, at notes 7 and 8.
36 In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 316 at 428 (1819), it is
said that a state legislature acts upon its constituents, which is in general a sufficient
security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. Then so long as a tax is nondiscriminatory, this security which is afforded the constituents of a legislature is
afforded the federal instrumentality.
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ment of all the people does not contribute, the state taxing system is
thrown out of gear, inequality and injustice result from establishment
of exemptions, and some individuals pay a disproportionate share of the
cost of both governments.

3.
If increased cost to the government is not an unconstitutional interference, in what other way can the operation of a state tax impede
the exercise of federal functions? It is submitted that ordinarily a
state tax which in terms or effect 37 is discriminatory will be the only
kind having that effect. In such a case, as in McCulloch 'U. Maryland
and Bank v. Osborn, the chosen instrumentality of the federal government cannot successfully endure in the economic struggle, and the
Congressional purpose is defeated. But such discriminatory taxes are
bad for other reasons, and reliance need not be placed on the ground
under discussion in order to invalidate them.
Seldom if ever has a case appeared where the government needed
preferential treatment to secure proper execution of its plans. 38 And
if such preferential treatment is deemed necessary, then as an adjunct
of its power to carry out the scheme, Congress ought to have the power
to establish in its discretion an express exemption.30 Then responsibility
for the results of such exemption is determined.
The decisions in the instant cases do much to establish firmly the
trend away from exemption which is noticeable in the recent cases. The
importance of that trend cannot be exaggerated. 40 The increasing governmental costs demand an ever-widening tax base, and the taxpayers
are entitled to substantial equality.41 Nor should the state governments
37
The tax would be discriminatory in effect, for instance, if the subject matter of
the tax were some unique relation.
38
In The Banks v. The Mayor, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 16 (1868), discussed supra
note 14, conceivably a preference was needed to insure prompt and free circulation of
the greenbacks, which was the Congressional aim.
89 Congress may deny its instrumentalities exemptions if it chooses. See for instance, Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 573 (1865), discussed supra note
23, and Owensboro Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664, 19 S. Ct. 537 (1899), discussed supra note 17. Of course, if granted for the Congressional instrumentality, the
same exemption ought to extend to similar state instrumentalities; otherwise, the result
is a discrimination against those state instrumentalities.
40
In the instant cases, the United States government appeared as amicus curiae,
and argued through Solicitor-General Reed that any non-discriminatory state tax
ought to be good. In recent cases where the validity of a state tax is involved, the federal
government has appeared as amicus curiae, realizing that because of the reciprocal
exemption doctrine, its own taxing power may be further limited by the creation of a
new exemption.
41 Fifteen billions of dollars of federal securities are wholly exempt from taxation,
twenty-two billions are partially exempt, while nineteen billions of state and municipal
bonds are wholly exempt. There is an estimated loss to the federal government of
seventy millions a year because of the inability to tax these state bonds. 6 U. S. NEWs
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be denied a fair opportunity to develop tax systems adequate to their
needs. 42 Certainly the doctrine of exemption enunciated in the cases is
an obstacle to any comprehensive scheme of state tax reform. The
present cases minimize the effect of that doctrine.
James H. Kilbourne

I (May 9, 1938). Of course, in so far as the states would have to pay higher interest
rates if their securities were subject to federal taxation, this loss to the federal government and its taxpayers is a gain for the state governments and their taxpayers.
42 Chief Justice Chase, who wrote the opinion in Thomson v. Pacific Railway, 9
Wall. (76 U. S.) 579 at 591 (1869), recognizes this necessity in denying the claim
for exemption put forth there.

